SB64 IN BONN: ARTICLE 6 UNDER REVIEW: What the negotiations mean for West Africa ?
From 8 to 18 June 2026, the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) met in Bonn to prepare for COP31, to be held in Turkey in November. For our member countries and carbon market actors in West Africa, Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which governs international climate cooperation mechanisms, carbon markets, and non-market approaches, stands at the centre of the debates. This bulletin provides a comprehensive assessment of the Article 6 negotiations throughout SB64 (8–18 June 2026), drawing on ENB/IISD daily reports through 17 June, to inform the positions our member countries will need to defend at COP31 in Antalya.
1. Article 6.2 — Bilateral Cooperative Approaches: Financing at the Heart of the Debate
The bilateral track of Article 6, which allows two Parties to cooperate on verified emission reductions in the form of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), concentrated the bulk of the week’s technical exchanges. The central issue was not the legitimacy of the mechanism, now broadly established, but its financing architecture.
A clearly identified budget deficit
The UNFCCC Secretariat presented precise data that structured all discussions: activities under Article 6.2 (international registry, centralised accounting platform, technical expert reviews, capacity building) represent an approved budget of USD 10.7 million, of which only USD 2.1 million is effectively available for the 2026–2027 period. The deficit therefore stands at USD 8–9 million. At this stage, 48 cooperative approaches have already been submitted to the centralised platform, and 67 Parties have expressed interest in the international registry, illustrating the growing interest in this mechanism and the urgency of ensuring its sustainable financing.
Four options, divergent positions
Four financing options were submitted for Parties’ consideration:
- Integration into the UNFCCC biennial core budget (financed by all Parties)
- Additional financing through voluntary contributions from Parties
- Usage-based fees (charged to actors using the tools)
- User fees levied directly on participating Parties
Positions were sharply drawn. The African Group, LDCs, landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), and small island developing states (SIDS/AOSIS) firmly defended the principle that access to the international registry should not constitute a financial burden for developing countries. AOSIS recalled that financing for capacity building and technology transfer should flow to developing countries, not from them. The Philippines suggested exploring the creation of a dedicated trust fund, or a specific window for Article 6.2 within existing UNFCCC trust funds. This position rests on a logic of coherence: the international registry was precisely designed to enable Parties without their own accounting infrastructure to participate fully in ITMO exchanges. Imposing fees would undermine the very accessibility of the mechanism.
On the other side, the European Union expressed its preference for a system that would eventually be self-financing through fees, while New Zealand argued that no specific financing mechanism was needed, as ordinary UNFCCC budget processes could suffice. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) supported a combination of additional voluntary contributions and usage-based fees. The African Group clarified its position: no fees on Parties using the international registry, but fees potentially conceivable for private sector actors.
Intermediate positions also emerged, notably that of Brazil, which proposed a pragmatic two-step approach: voluntary contributions in the short term to address the immediate deficit, followed by a structured mapping by the Secretariat of needs by category and urgency to identify the most appropriate financing source in the medium term.
Final outcome on Article 6.2
The co-facilitators (Kenya and Norway) progressively refined an informal note throughout the week, through daily exchanges among delegations. Debates on 11, 12, and 13 June helped clarify positions: the African Group confirmed its support for financing through the UNFCCC core budget, with voluntary contributions to address the immediate deficit, while opposing any fees on Parties using the international registry. AOSIS, judging that non-participating Parties should not finance a mechanism from which they do not benefit, opposed core budget financing and instead supported a combination of voluntary contributions and usage fees with exemptions for SIDS. Brazil proposed a pragmatic two-step approach: voluntary contributions in the short term to cover the deficit, followed by a structured mapping of needs by the Secretariat to identify the most appropriate sources in the medium term. On 13 June, the possibility of a dedicated Article 6.2 trust fund, similar to the CDM trust fund, emerged as a concrete option to receive targeted voluntary contributions. On 15 June, partial progress was recorded: Parties agreed to recall decision 19/CMA.7 inviting voluntary contributions to the supplementary trust fund, and Switzerland secured language calling on the Secretariat to “strengthen and scale up” its fundraising efforts. The debates of 16 and 17 June failed to resolve the fundamental disagreements on the financing source. The SBI conclusions ultimately adopted record three elements: the recall of decision 19/CMA.7 inviting voluntary contributions to the supplementary trust fund; a request to the Secretariat to “strengthen and scale up” its fundraising efforts; and an information note on budget assumptions. The USD 8–9 million deficit remains unfunded at the close of the session: the question of the financing source is entirely deferred to COP31.
2. Article 6.4 — The Carbon Crediting Mechanism: An Institutional Deadlock with Concrete Consequences
The Article 6.4 mechanism (successor to the Clean Development Mechanism) is intimately linked to a question that crystallised tensions in Bonn: the transition of the Adaptation Fund to operating exclusively in service of the Paris Agreement.
The crux of the problem
A share of the proceeds generated by transactions under the Article 6.4 mechanism, the share of proceeds (SOP), is intended to finance the Adaptation Fund. This monetisation can only take place once the Fund’s transition has been formally agreed by Parties. However, a persistent disagreement over the composition of the Fund’s Board is blocking the entire process.
Concretely, several Parties (Switzerland, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway) have made their agreement on the transition conditional on a change in the representation nomenclature within the Board: moving from “Annex I / non-Annex I” categories to “developed / developing countries”. While the change may appear semantic on the surface, it in fact touches on carefully negotiated governance balances.
The African Group and others argued that the monetisation of SOPs should be organised as a priority, with the composition question addressed in a second step. This sequential approach did not achieve consensus at this stage. On 11 June, the situation reached a notable point of procedural tension when a point of order was raised to ask the co-chairs to rule on whether agreement existed on the transition texts. The Secretariat’s legal counsel was cautious: in the absence of explicit consensus, the texts are not transmitted.
On 11 June, the Arab Group invoked a point of order in an attempt to have the transition texts — deemed “clean” by several groups — transmitted, but the Secretariat’s legal counsel confirmed that in the absence of explicit consensus, no text can be transmitted. The deadlock persisted throughout the second week. On 17 June, a heads-of-delegation meeting failed to reach a breakthrough; it was ultimately in the negotiating room, through successive compromises that the ENB report describes as “compromises on compromises”, that Parties found agreement. The SBI conclusions record that the session continued the examination of three distinct mandates (transition arrangements, 5th review of the Fund, Board composition); note progress on the first two; and refer the composition question to SBI 65. Concretely, as long as the Board composition remains unresolved, the SOP revenues from the Article 6.4 mechanism cannot flow to the Adaptation Fund — directly delaying financial flows to vulnerable countries, including those in West Africa.
3. Article 6.8 — Non-Market Approaches: Technical Work Advancing
The non-market track of Article 6, which encompasses climate cooperation based on technology transfers, capacity building, or direct budget support, without a credit-trading mechanism, experienced a calmer week of work.
The Glasgow Committee on NMAs worked on the themes of its sub-groups, with proposals centred on forest ecosystems, carbon sequestration, and the energy transition. On 13 June, co-facilitators presented an informal note on the review of the NMA work programme, and Parties put forward suggestions on additional functionalities desired for the dedicated platform. Ukraine notably proposed clarifying that infrastructure users are not necessarily participating Parties, by specifying “participating Parties and entities.” Brazil suggested using the NMA platform to register non-market approaches within the national implementation framework. The relative calm of these exchanges, compared with the complexity of the debates on tracks 6.2 and 6.4, is itself a positive sign for the operationalisation of Article 6.8.
The SBSTA conclusions were adopted at the close of the session without major procedural obstruction: work will continue at COP31 on the basis of the revised informal note. Article 6.8 is thus the only one of the three pillars of Article 6 to have progressed smoothly in Bonn.
4. Cross-Cutting Signals to Watch
The US withdrawal: a collective budgetary constraint
At an information event on 12 June, the Secretariat presented an assessment of the financial impact of the United States’ withdrawal from the Convention, effective 27 February 2027. As the largest contributor to the core budget, their departure would result in a 27% increase in contributions for all remaining Parties in order to maintain the current budget. Executive Secretary Simon Stiell stressed the need for early engagement to mitigate the budget shortfall for the 2028–2029 biennium. This overall budgetary pressure is already feeding resistance to additional financing, including for Article 6.2 infrastructure, making the resolution of the financing issue all the more urgent before COP31.
Carbon markets within the Global Stocktake
The dialogue on the implementation of the first Global Stocktake (GST) confirmed, on 10 June, that carbon markets are among the priority opportunities for accelerating mitigation at the global scale. Delegates explicitly cited two levers: ensuring that global carbon markets align with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and promoting both forest emission reductions and removals. These discussions also highlighted persistent structural obstacles (high cost of capital, limited access to concessional finance, insufficient capacity building) which directly weigh on the competitiveness of West African projects. For project developers in West Africa, the increasingly stringent integrity requirements of international buyers represent both a compliance constraint and a market value lever.
Vigilance on the interpretation of rules
The Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) took care to recall, on the very first day of SB64, that the technical expert reviewers responsible for implementing Article 6 must adhere strictly to the decisions adopted by Parties, without reinterpreting them. This signal indicates that the operational implementation of Article 6 is still the subject of tension between political decisions and their technical translation on the ground.
5. Outlook for COP31
The SB64 assessment on Article 6 is mixed. On track 6.2, SBI conclusions were indeed adopted, but they do not resolve the fundamental question: who finances the USD 8–9 million deficit? The debate is entirely deferred to COP31. On track 6.4, a fragile agreement was reached at the last minute on 17 June after a heads-of-delegation meeting failed: the conclusions record progress on the transition and the 5th review of the Adaptation Fund, but refer the Board composition to SBI 65, thus maintaining the deadlock on SOP monetisation. On track 6.8, this is the only fully satisfactory outcome: the SBSTA conclusions were adopted without controversy. Beyond Article 6, SB64 was marked by intense tensions in many rooms — accusations of “hostage-taking”, several agenda items closed without even procedural conclusions — and by a single collectively celebrated agreement: the designation of UNEP to continue hosting the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).
On this basis, the West African Alliance on Carbon Markets and Climate Finance identifies three priority areas of work for the coming months:
- Advocating for non-discriminatory financing of Article 6.2.
The Bonn discussions have laid the groundwork for a compromise. It is now essential that West African delegations ensure that any final decision includes explicit fee exemptions for developing countries, particularly LDCs and SIDS. Affordable access to the international registry is a necessary condition for our participation in ITMO exchanges.
- Supporting the unblocking of the Adaptation Fund transition.
The Article 6.4 mechanism will not be able to generate financial flows to the Adaptation Fund as long as the institutional question of Board composition remains unresolved. Our member states would benefit from actively participating in intersessional consultations on this issue, in order to help find a pragmatic solution that does not further delay the monetisation of the share of proceeds.
- Strengthening our national MRV systems.
Carbon credit integrity is now an explicit requirement of international buyers. Investing in national measurement, reporting, and verification capacities is the only lever over which our countries exercise direct control, and it is also the key to market confidence.
Conclusion
SB64 confirms that Article 6 has entered its operational implementation phase, but that this phase is running up against concrete institutional obstacles that are delaying its effects. For West Africa, three issues are immediate: access to the international registry without additional costs for our countries; financial flows to the Adaptation Fund, which depend on a political unblocking deferred to SBI 65; and the capacity to generate ITMOs recognised on international markets. These three issues will be at the heart of the COP31 negotiations.
The West African Carbon Market Alliance publishes this comprehensive SB64 assessment, covering Article 6 negotiations from 8 to 17 June 2026. We encourage our member countries to draw on it to inform their national consultations and coordinate their positions ahead of COP31 in Antalya (November 2026).